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DEPORTATION AND JUSTICE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
DANIEL KANSTROOM *
Abstract: Recent statutory changes to United States immigration law
have resulted in a large increase in the number, of lawful permanent
resident noncitizens who are deported because of prior criminal
conduct. Now, deportation is often a virtually automatic consequence of
conviction for an increasingly minor array of crimes including
possessory drug offenses and shoplifting. Under current statutory law,
permanent resident noncitizens may be deported for crimes that were
not grounds for deportation when they were committed and there may
be no possibility of mercy or humanitarian relief. This Dialogue
explores arguments for and against this system. Specifically, it examines
the idea, rooted in history, that deportation is an unconstitutional
punishment for criminal offenses.
[77o understand what a constitution is, one must look not for some ►ystal-
line core or essence of unambiguous meaning but precisely at the ambigui-
ties, the specific oppositions that this specific concept helps us to hold in ten-
sion.'
Critic: Mr. Kanstroom, I have read your two most recent articles 2 and I
think I get the gist of your arguments but I am puzzled by a few
things. First, could you state your basic criticism of the current state of
U.S. deportation law?
Author: Our current deportation laws are disproportionately harsh
and unforgiving. The system as a whole is unjust. As a social experi-
* 2000 Daniel Kanstroom. Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law
School; Director, Boston College Immigration and Asylum Project.
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167 (1987).
See generally HANNA FENICHEI. PI•KIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE (1972) (elaborating
further on this theme).
2 This Dialogue is part of a larger project that critiques the current state of United
States deportation law. It is designed to be read in conjunction with two other articles:
Daniel Kanstroom, Cuing Wolf or a Dying Canary?, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.. CHANGE
(forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Kanstroom, Crying Wolf]; and Daniel Kanstroom, Depo•ta-
tion, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Haut Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
Ham'. L. REV. 1889 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstrootn, Deportation, Social Control'. These arti-
cles have been made possible by support from Deans Avian Soifer, James Rogers and John
Garvey and a grant from Walter I). Wekstein, for which I am most grateful.
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.ment it has caused great harm. As a model upon which to base future
enforcement systems, it is excessive and dangerous.
Critic: Thank you. That was simple and concise. Now, could you be
just a bit more specific?
Author: Sure. One of the central features of U.S. immigration law dur-
ing the past decade or so has been a dramatic increase in the num-
bers of noncitizens who are deported due to criminal conduct. 3 Many
politicians and commentators have supported this trend, which cul-
minated in the package of laws enacted in 1996.4 Recently, however,
concerns have been voiced about the harshness of this system, 5 its
inflexibility,6
 the effect it has had on families and communities, 7 and
its meaning as an example of excessive government power directed
against a relatively powerless minority. 8
 These concerns, which I think
are well-founded, should lead us to question our approach to this
whole subject.
First, and most basically, why should we deport noncitizens, par-
ticularly long-term legal residents who commit crimes, instead of just
punishing them in the criminal justice system as we do citizens? Even
though we have grown accustomed to this idea, it is far from self-
evident that our current system makes sense. Indeed, it embodies a
host of contestable assumptions about the meaning of "permanent"
Or other long-term residence in the United States. It also seems
strongly to undervalue family unity and stability 9 in the service of law
enforcement goals. My secondary point, though, is that if we must do
3
 See statistics cited in Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1890 n.2.
See id. at 1890-91.
5
 See, e.g., Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in Jails in the United States, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, Sept. 1998.
6 See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Ilk at Least Some of the Con-
stitu6ores Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 305, 340-43 (2000)
(suggesting need to return more discretion to immigration judges to grant waivers from
deportation.). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discre-
tion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 Tut,. L. Rev. 703 (1997) (analyzing discretion
in immigration law and suggesting ways to structure it in the aftermath of 1996 changes to
the Immigration and Nationality Act).
7 See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmerman, Urban Institute, All Under One Roof Mixed Fami-
lies in an Era of Reform (last modified June 1999)‹http://wwwurban.org/itnmig/
akunder.html>.
See Kanstroom, Crying Wolf, supra note 2, at	 .
9 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1950-54 (2000) (discussing the
impact of the 1996 immigration laws on families of legal permanent residents convicted of
crimes) [hereinafter Morawetz, Understanding the Impact].
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this, we should at least strive for consistency in our constitutional un-
derstanding of what seem clearly to be punitive sanctions.
Critic: Tell me more about why you think that deportation for crime is
wrong. I have to say that it seems perfectly reasonable to me.
Author: Well, let me start with what I think is my strongest point and
then we can move to more marginal issues. If proportionality is a fun-
damental component of justice, as I believe it is, then it is unfair and
unjust to deport and banish for life a long-term legal permanent resi-
dent with family here and no contacts in her country of birth who
commits a single minor crime.
Gide: Do we really do that?
Author: It's even worse than that. Imagine a person who has lived in
the United States since early childhood as a lawful permanent resi-
dent, whose entire family is here, whose spouse and children are U.S.
citizens, who speaks only English and knows no other culture but
ours. Such a person can now be arrested by armed agents of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, will have no right to appointed
counsel, may be subjected to mandatory detention with no tight even
to apply for release on bail, and may be deported and banished for-
ever." All this for a minor criminal offense committed years ago,
which may not even have been a ground for deportation when it was
committed and may not have been considered a conviction under the
law of the state where it occurred. Our current laws fail to provide an
immigration judge with any discretion to provide humanitarian relief
in such a situation. Finally, the deportee may well have no right to
have an independent federal judge review the case.n
Critic: You do make it sound pretty bad; but slow down. What do you
mean by "a minor offense?"
Author: A conviction for petty larceny, 12 simple assault," or driving
while intoxicated can be an aggravated felony." A noncitizen con-
10 Deportation for an aggravated felony results in a permanent bar against reentry into
the United States. See INA § 212 (a) (9) (A) (ii) (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (9) (A) (ii) (II) (Stipp.
II 11196).
11 See grnerally Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Lain after the 1996 Immigra- .
don Ad, 113 HAIM L. Rev. 1963, 1975-82 (2000) [hereinafter Neuman,fierisdirtioni.
12 See United' Stales v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 791-93 (3d Cir.) (holding that misde-
meanor petty theft with one year maximum sentence under New York law was an "aggra-
vated felony"), cert. denied, U.S. 120 S. Ct. 116 (1999).
15 See INA § 101(a) (43) (F), 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a) (43) (F) (Sapp. 11 1996) ("crime of vio-
lence" as an "aggravated felony").
14 See, e.g., In re Magallanes, Int. Dec. 3341 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 1998) (holding that Arizona
conviction for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol was a "crime of violence"
and therefore an "aggravated felony").
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victed of an aggravated felony is subject to removal from the United
States with virtually no possibility of relief on humanitarian or other
grounds. That person will also be banned for life from returning to
the United States. Length of residence is irrelevant. Family ties here
are meaningless. Hardship is immaterial.
Critic: But if the crime is a felony then it hardly qualifies as a minor
crime, does it?
Author: Well, maybe not. But as it turns out, the definition of a felony
is very complicated in this context. The INS has moved to deport
people, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 15 and some courts16
have affirmed deportation orders even if the state in which the con-
viction occurred does not consider it a felony.° You'd be surprised
how minor some of these cases are.
Critic: Hum. Well, in any case, the defendant has been convicted,
presumably after a trial ,
 or after a plea with counsel. So, it must have
been serious or the case could have been disposed of in some other
way to avoid deportation problems.
Author: Well, I'd like to think so, but whenyou get into the trenches a
bit the picture is not so pretty. First, as you probably know, there is no
Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in deportation proceed-
ings. 18 Nor is it generally required as a matter of due process. 19 Sec-
ond, although many defense lawyers, appointed or privately retained,
may care about deportation consequences, many others may not." It
16 See In re L-G-, Int. Dec. 3254 (B.LA. Sept. 27, 1995) (employing Davis/Barrett test
where state drug offense can qualify as an "aggravated felony" under INA, regardless of
state classification of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor, if offense is analogous to a
felony under the federal drug statutes); cf. In re K-V-D-, Int. Dec. 3422 (ILIA. Dec. 10,
1999) (concluding that conviction that was a felony under state law but a misdemeanor
under federal law was not an aggravated felony under the INA).
16
 See Graham, 169 F.3d at 793.
17
 See generally Morawetz, Understanding the Impact, supra note 9, at 1939-41 (discussing
term "aggravated felony" under the 1996 immigration laws).
16 See Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 1999); Magallanes-Damian v. INS,
783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986). Some courts, however, have occasionally recognized a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel under very specific circumstances. See, e.g., Rios-Berrios
v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985). For a more complete discussion of this issue, see
Panty, supra note 6, at 309-11.
L 9 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1896 n.37.
2° A need exists for an empirical study of this question. In the author's personal expe-
rience of more than fifteen years of practice and training lawyers about immigration con-
sequences, however, the range of concern expressed by defense lawyers about immigration
consequences has been very broad. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently suggested
that "Igloo[ defense counsel in criminal cases often advise clients about immigration law
consequences." Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9152, at *25 (1st Cir.
May 8, 2000).
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is far from settled that it is ineffective assistance for a defense lawyer
to overlook or even misadvise about deportation. Indeed, the general
rule is to the contrary. 21 Courts are generally quite reluctant to allow a
defendant to withdraw a plea, even if he was never warned that it
would result in deportation. 22
Critic: But if a lawyer does do a good job and gets a dismissal or some
sort of state diversionary disposition that will prevent deportation,
right?
Author: No, it will not. The Board of Immigration Appeals has held
that the federal definition of conviction, 23 passed by Congress in 1996,
controls in all such cases. 24 As a result, even if the sentencing judge
dismisses the case, it will not necessarily prevent deportation.
Critic: Well, that does seem harsh; though I suppose it is a natural
consequence of the fact that immigration is a question of federal and
not state law. But, rather than open that can of worms, answer this for
me. Aren't there still ways to avoid deportation; like dragging the case
out with years of appeals?
Author: Not really. Some think that this is the essence of deportation
defense25 but Congress has created a system of mandatory detention
21 See, e.g., United States v. Yacoub, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at *3 (7tl ► Cir. May
22, 2000) (describing deportation as collateral consequence of a criminal conviction);
United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 24-28 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that
recent amendments to the INA have so altered the relationship between conviction anti
deportation that revisitation of prior holdings on that relationship is required and barring
ineffective assistance claims based on an attorney's failure to advise his client of the immi-
gration consequences of his client's plea).
22
 See. Yacoub, 2000 U.S, App. LEXIS 11790, at *3; Gonzalez, 202 F.3d at 23, 28. An ex-
ception to this rule may occur in stales such as Massachusetts where judges are required by
statute to warn defendants of immigration consequences to pleas, See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch.278, § 29D (West 1998); Commonwealth v. Soto, 727 N.E.2d 811, 812-13 (Mass.
2000) (entering order allowing defendant to withdraw guilty pleas where judge failed to
provide full statutory warning during plea colloquy).
22 See INA § 101(a) (48); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48) (Stipp. 11 1996) (defining "convic-
tion").
24 See In re Roldan-Samoyo, Int. Dec. 3377 (B.1.A. Mar. 3, 1999) (holding that under
the statutory definition of "conviction" provided at INA § 101(a) (48) (A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (48) (A), no effect is to be given in immigration proceedings to a state action,
which purports to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a guilty
plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a state rehabilitative statute).
25 See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 490
.(1999) ("Postponing justifiable deportation [in the hope that the alien's status will
change—by, for example, marriage to an American citizen—or simply with the object of
extending the alien's unlawful stay) is often the principal object of resistance to a deporta-
tion proceeding, and the additional obstacle of selective-enforcement suits could leave the
INS hard pressed to enforce routine status requirements.").
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of virtually all noncitizens who face deportation for crime. 26 This
means that if a person wants to contest the case, she will likely remain
incarcerated for however long such appeals last.27 This is, to say the
least, a very powerful inducement to give up. And as I, or anyone else
who practices regularly in the field can tell you, many, many clients do
simply give up even though they have powerful arguments against de-
portation. 28
 Also, the 1996 laws severely restrict judicial review in re-
moval cases that involve criminal conduct. 29
Critic: Well, doesn't that argue in favor of these laws as a legitimate
disincentive to dilatory tactics and risk of flight?
Author: I suppose it might. But we ought to weigh the effects of the
alleged disease against those of the cure. Surely there are better ways
to speed cases along than mandatory detention and the complete
elimination of judicial review.
Critic: What about discretion? You make it sound as if there is no
hope for any of these people. I thought you could ask an immigration
judge to forgive and forget a minor conviction?
Author: Well, under certain very limited circumstances you still can."
But not if there has been a conviction for an aggravated felony. 31 And,
as I explained before, many apparently minor crimes, including state
misdemeanors and cases that have been disposed of under state diver ,
sionary procedures for minor offenders, are aggravated felonies.
Critic: So what remedy would you propose for all this?
Author: Well, I think the system of deporting legal permanent resi-
dents for criminal conduct should be scrapped entirely by the Con-
. gress. It is extremely harsh; it harms families who are left behind; it
embodies a throw-away attitude about people that is a dangerous
" See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(c) (Stipp. II 1996) ("Apprehension and detention
of aliens").
27
 In fact, if a deportation order cannot be effected once appeals are all concluded, a
person may still face years of detention with no right to release. See, e.g., Ho v. Greene, 204
F.3d 1045, 1057-60 (10th Gin 2000) (concluding that no statutory or constitutional im-
pediment to continuing detention of non-citizens following removal order, even if lawful
permanent residents).
See Morawetz, Understanding the Impact, supra note 9, at 1947.
" See Neuman, Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 1976-82; see also David Cole, Jurisdiction
and Liberty: Habeas Campus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's Control of Federal furisdiction,
86 GEO. U. 2481, 2485-89 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Applying the Suspension Clause to
Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1068, 1068+ (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress,
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 CEO. L.J. 2537, 2565-84 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman,
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLLIN!. L. Rev. 961, 965-68
(1998).
3° See, e.g., INA § 240A; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Stipp. II 1996) ("cancellation of removal").
St See id. (a) (3).
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model; it is bad foreign policy because the countries to which people
are sent then have to deal with an array of related social problems
which they are often ill-equipped to handle. Also, it severely depreci-
ates the status of lawful permanent residents and it seems to consti-
tute double punishment. 52
Critic: But wouldn't that depreciate the value of citizenship? The es-
sence of the citizen/alien dichotomy is that aliens are not full mem-
bers of the nation-state. Isn't the risk of deportation one of the main
components of that lack of full membership?
Author: I suppose in some abstract sense it is. But the harshness and
social costs of certain types of deportations are more compelling. Fur-
thermore, the risk of deportation is far from the only disadvantage
facing noncitizens. After all, noncitizens are required to register with
INS," and to be very careful about how long they remain outside the
U.S. on pain of losing their status. 34 They are not allowed to vote,"
they are ineligible for certain social safety net protections" and ineli-
gible for certain jobs." Their ability to bring family members .here is
much more limited than that of citizens." And so on. I really don't
see how a much more limited deportation regime threatens to bring
down the whole citizen/alien edifice." There are still plenty of dis-
32 See generally Kanst•ooin Deportation, Social Control supra note 2.
33 See INA § 262, 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (requiring every alien to register and be
fingerprinted if remaining in the U.S. for 30 days or more); 266(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)
(failing to register results in charge of misdemeanor and fine of $1000 and/or six months
imprisonment).
" See INA § 101(a) (13) (c) (prescribing limits on rights of entry by lawful permanent
residents);'see also 8 C.F.R. § 211.1 (b) (1) (A) (stating INS presumption that legal residency
is abandoned after one year outside the United States).
33 See U.S. CoNsT. amends. XV, XI X, XXVI. See generally Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 Mien. L. Rev. 1092 (1977).
36 See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (5) (prescribing deportation for becom-
ing a "public charge").
3' See generally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. !Irv. 1047, 1110-15 (1994) (discussing "political function" exception).
33 See, e.g., INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (differentiating system of immigration for rela-
tives of citizens from that for relatives of permanent resident aliens).
" See generally Developments in the Law—Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HAM'. L. REv. 1286, 1304 (1983), One commentator asserted:
The new fiinctional style of inquiry that the Court adopted led it to abandon
the approach to aliens' rights that had rested upon the formal categories of
"citizen" and "alien." In place of the formal approach, the Court evolved a
model of analysis attuned to the alien's real participation in society, one rec-
ognizing that the alien, as her identification with the community deepened,
came increasingly to resemble the citizen. This participation model,
reflecting the Court's new interest in the promotion of substantive fairness in
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tinctions and inducements to naturalize. I doubt, in any case, that
Congress will agree with me, so my other idea is simply that courts
should apply specific constitutional protections to such cases, analo-
gous to those granted to criminal defendants. I think the current sys--
tem is basically unconstitutional.
Critic: Well, if our duly elected representatives want to get tough on
criminal aliens44Iyou may not like it, but I hardly see why it's unconsti-
tutional. After all, aliens who come to the United States know that
they are, in effect, on probation until they become citizens. If they
violate their terms, they face the consequence they always knew was
there: deportation. What's unconstitutional about that?
Author: Your argument proves too much. It is one thing to say to a
person, "you are on probation." It is quite another to say, "you may be
deported at any time for any reason, even if it's a single drug offense,
and you've lived here for fifty years, have no family elsewhere, etc.
Even the fact that you complied with every term we placed on your
residence at the time it was placed is irrelevant. You are now retroac-
tively deemed in violation." There have to be limits beyond which the
probation metaphor breaks down. What if we were to say to people,
"you may enter the U.S. and live here, but if you litter you will be
shot?" It is hardly a sufficient justification of such a law to say that it's
just part of their "probation" as noncitizens.
Critic: That's an absurd hypothetical, of course. But leaving the death
penalty out of it for the moment, I'm not convinced that anything is
constitutionally wrong with a harsh deportation law. If a citizen can
the "private sphere," accords the alien "a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society." The alien enters the
United States, finds employment, settles down, and has a family; with each
successive step her assimilation into society becomes more complete. The
participation model recognizes this process and bases on it the gradual grant
of rights to the alien.
See id. (footnotes omitted).
40 Within the past fifteen years, Congress has often addressed the issue of deportation
for crime. See, e.g., Pub. L. No.105-141, 111 Stat. 2697 (1997); Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Immi-
gration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat.
4305 (1994); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991); Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No, 101-699, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
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get life in prison for petty larceny in a "three strikes" jurisdiction why
couldn't we deport someone for littering?
Author: Your point is well-taken. And I suppose it's obvious that I'm
not a big fan of "three strikes" laws either. Much of the argument boils
down to the question whether there is an implicit constitutional right
to proportionality in penal laws. The Supreme Court, at the moment,
seems ". cl arly inclined to answer this general question negatively,
though the Court has been somewhat more receptive to such claims
in the past. 42 But traditional deportation doctrine doesn't ever ad-
dress this issue because of the formalism that deportation of any type
is never punishment for constitutional purposes. 43 I think we should
change at least that so that we could more directly grapple with the
proportionality problem in the deportation context. 44
41 See, e.g., Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1999) (denying certiorari in case
raising issue whether California "three strikes" law is disproportionate when applied to a
misdemeanor conviction); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001-00 (1991) (holding
that mandatory sentence of life without parole for drug possession did not violate Eighth
Amendment); rf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334-44 (1998) (applying pro-
portionality analysis under Excessive Fines Clause).
42 See, e.g., Solent v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that Eighth Amendment
prohibits grossly disproportionate sentences); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting)) (stating that punishtnent is excessive if length or severity is dispro-
portionate to offense); Trop v, Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (reasoning implicitly that
proportionality analysis required under Eighth Amendment).
45 See generally Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1899-1915.
44 Peter Schack stated the issue well:
In view of what is inevitably and personally at stake, then, it is undeniable that
deportation punishes the alien and punishes her severely.... To maintain, as
classical immigration law consistently has clone, that deportation resembles a
sanction like being ejected from a national park rather than that of being
banished or sentenced to jail, suggests that something deeply symbolic, not
dryly logical, has been at work in the shaping of the doctrine. In condoning
the deportation of the alien without the safeguards that government must or-
dinarily afford before it can impose grave punishment the law affirms the
contingent. nature of her claims on the comninity.... The government's ob-
ligations to the alien are viewed as resting upon her formal status rather than
upon her actual relationship to the society. Since under the classical order the
alien's entry was conceived of as a privilege whose continued enjoyment was
conditional upon her compliance with the formal terms that the government.
prescribed, deportation was simply the revocation of her license, a reversion
to the status quo ante. No special procedural safeguards for this reversion
were thought. to be necessary.
Peter	 Schack, The Transformation of ImMigration Law, 84 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 27 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
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Critic: Well, maybe more consistency between deportation law and
other legal questions would be a good thing. I'm not sure yet. Still, it
seems that you want consistency on the theory of punishment side,
but you don't like the basic citizen/alien distinction as it has evolved.
You may not like the plenary power doctrine and its implications for
deportation law, but it's not necessarily inconsistent, is it?
Author: Well, the current state of the law: a flexible procedural calcu-
lus in deportation proceedings derived from Yaniataya v. Fisher 45 and
Mathews v. Eldridge46 combined with a complex system of equal protec-
tion rights for noncitizens in other contexts, does have some inconsis-
tencies. For example, a noncitizen in removal proceedings may have a
right to appointed counsel but only if a reviewing court, on the basis
of a record created without counsel, determines that counsel was re-
quired.47 And too heavy a reliance on the citizen/alien line raises sub-
stantial equal protection problems. It is, after all, not so easy to recon-
cile Yick Wo v. Hopkins 48 with Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 49
Critic: Okay, but I still don't see why deportation should be seen as
punishment. Aliens may be punished by the criminal justice system if
their violation is criminal; but the deportation itself is no more pun-
ishment than any other collateral consequence of criminal activity,
like being evicted from public housing, for example. It's part of the
regulation of our immigration system. Your approach throws a lot of
other well-settled doctrine into question.
Author: Maybe. Or perhaps what I mean to say is: "good." I think that
each ostensibly civil or collateral consequence should be considered
on the merits to determine whether—under the circumstances in
which it is imposed—it is punishment or not. It is hardly sufficient to
say, as Justice Frankfurter once did, that it's not punishment because
the Court has not historically considered it to be punishment. 5°
Critic: So, precedent doesn't matter to you, either?
Author: Precedent matters, of course but circumstances change, too.
This system is uniquely punitive, even in a time of strict and harsh
criminal laws such as the present.
45 189 U.S.. 86 (1903).
48 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47 See supra note 18 (discussing right to counsel in deportation hearings).
48
 118 U.S. 356, 369, 373-74 (1886) (holding that Chinese noncitizens have rights to
equal protection).
49
 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (concluding that deportation power was as "absolute and
unqualified" as the power to exclude noncitizens from entering the U.S.).
w See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954).
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Critic: Isn't there a real distinction between regulation and punish-
ment? The Court has certainly found this line workable for many
years, in a wide variety of contexts.'
Author: Let me answer this question with a question; what if Congress
were to refer to the death penalty not as punishment but simply as the
"temporal regulation of mortality?"
Critic: That would obviously be different. I think you are overstating
the Court's reliance on Congressional intent and formal categoriza-
tion, Many factors go into these decisions. The Court understands the
danger of formalistic reasoning.
Author: But what factors count, then?
Critic: Well, as I understand it the Court will consider the nature of
the sanction, its history, and the reason why it is imposed. 51
Author: Alla!
Critic: Aha?
Author: Yes. "Aha," because you have now accepted my basic premise:
that the label of punishment should be applied, if appropriate, to de-
portation as the product of a functional, historical, and intentional
analysis. It should not be used to preclude that sort of inquiry.
The deportation of long-term, legal permanent residents for
post-entry conduct is imposed as a direct consequence of a prior
"bad" act. Its purpose can hardly be said to be compensatory. Con-
gress was pretty clearly aiming at retribution or deterrence. These are
indicia of punishment, not regulation. Even though the harshness of
these laws is probably my main concern, it's not just the harshness
that matters.52
Critic: All right, I do see that a certain inevitably functional-type of
argument emerges here, but I'm still not convinced that deportation
itself rises to that level.
But let's move on. What is it that really bothers you so much
about the current system. Is it the retroactivity? I agree that that scents
quite severe and if I were a judge I'd probably hold the government
to a very high burden of clear drafting to accomplish this end, as I
understand some judges have. 53 I'd also probably extend every right
to discretionary relief from deportation that I could think of, as other
51 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1014-26.
52 For an insightful analysis of this general issue see Panw, supra note 6, at 330-31.
55 See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3(1 815,821-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying strict reading of
detention statute).
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judges have. 54 But do we really need to upset more than a century of
settled constitutional doctrine to do this?
Author: I think so, and here's why. First, although some judges have
tried to do so, strict statutory interpretation55 will not work well in
most cases because Congress has been quite clear about the retroac-
tivity of these laws. The substitution of exceedingly nice statutory in-
terpretation for forthright constitutional analysis may be justified and
pragmatic in a given case, but it also risks delegitimizing the whole
judicial enterprise.56 Ultimately, you will either have to invoke the ex
post facto clause57 or perhaps rely on substantive due process or analo-
gies from cases like In re Gault.58
More fundamentally, though, it's not just the retroactivity that
concerns me. To extend potentially arbitrary, retroactive, unreview-
able government power over legal permanent residents renders their
status unacceptably precarious. Indeed, it calls into question their
status itself, as ostensibly "permanent" residents. Moreover, apart from
their rights as individuals, we ought to be concerned, as I have argued
elsewhere,59 and Jefferson and Madison long ago argued even more
forcefully and eloquently, whenever government seeks such power. It
is a dangerous experiment, to say the least, and it ought to be consti-
tutionally resisted.
Critic: Well, maybe. You, Jefferson, and Madison might be right about
the French who I suppose I could learn to tolerate. But why should I
5.1 For example, consider a recent series of First Circuit decisions involving the extent
to which so-called INA § 212(c) relief remains available. See Mattis, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
9152, at *22-*30; Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 1999); Goncalves v Reno, 144
F.3d 110, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1004 (1999).
55 See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (prescribing strict rule of statu-
tory construction for deportation cases).
56 As Hiroshi Mototunra has noted, the disinclination of the Court to revisit substan-
tive due process arguments has led to a "curious evolution" of hnmigration law. See Hiroshi
Motoniura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLum. L. REV. 1625, 1625 (1992) [hereinafter Motomura, The
Curious Evolution]. As part of this evolution, judges, who for a variety of reasons are reluc-
tant to apply some "mainstream constitutional norms" to immigration cases, sometimes
use statutory interpretation methods to achieve the same end. See Hiroshi Motomura, Im-
migration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
'AMID-elation, 100 YALE Lj. 545, 547-48, 564 (1990). Also, in some areas of immigration
law, procedural due process has occasionally served as a surrogate for substantive constitu-
tional review. See Motomura, The Curious Evolution, supra, at 1627-28.
57 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1917-20.
" See 387 U.S. 1, '34-38 (1967); Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at
1927-33. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.YU. L. Rev. 97 (1998); Pauw, supra note 6.
59 See generally Kanstroom, CryingVol/ supra note 2.
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be so concerned about criminal aliens? Although the precise details
of their "probation" might vary they surely know they shouldn't be
committing crimes. If they are convicted, the revocation of their resi-
dence here is not necessarily punishment for that crime and it doesn't
seem so unreasonable in any case. I'm not even sure it's really retroac-
tive. After all, they must have known that some crimes result in depor-
tation. It's just the details that have changed.
Author: Well, I have a couple of answers to this. The easiest might be
to suggest re-reading Calder v. Bull. 60 If a new law inflicts a greater
punishment on a prior crime, it violates the ex post facto clause.61 As
the Court put it more recently:
[A] hnost from the outset, we have recognized that central to
the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for "the lack of fair
notice and governmental restraint when the legislature in-
creases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consummated."62
Of course, you will undoubtedly note that I have now drifted into a
somewhat circular reasoning process, myself—assuming the conclu-
sion you are asking me to prove—that deportation is punishment.
Since your question is really more one of fairness than settled doc-
trine, let me respond in that vein.
First, I do not plan to run for public office so perhaps I feel more
comfortable than some parsing the appellation "criminal aliens"
closely. There is a lot of variation among members of this group. For
example, how does your no-punishment approach fit with people who
may have come here as babies or young children? In our clinical im-
migration program at Boston College Law School we've encountered
significant numbers of young people who actually thought they were
U.S. citizens, right up to the point where they ended up in INS deten-
60 3 U.S. (3 Dan.) 386, 390-97 (1798).
61 See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987) (application of Florida sentencing
statute to defendant for crimes committed before statute's effective date violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-36 (1081) (state statute reducing
amount. of "gain time" deductible from convicted prisoner's sentence was an unconstitu-
tional ex post facto law as applied to a person whose crhne was committed before statute's
enactment); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937) (application of state stat-
ute providing that a sentence shall be fixed by court at maximum term and for possible
earlier release through parole, which amended statute authorizing maximum and mini-
mum sentences, violated Ex Post Facto Clause as it provided a technical "increase in pun-
ishment" because accused were denied possibility of sentence of less than the maximum
without tutelage of parole).
02 Mille); 482 U.S. at 430 (citations omitted).
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Lion facing deportation. Others wanted to become citizens but
couldn't even start to do so until they turned eighteen, after which, in
many INS districts, the process can take years, due to administrative
delay (which, in turn, has been caused by increasing INS emphasis on
enforcement as opposed to service).
Second, to reiterate, what of proportionality? Doesn't it trouble
you to see deportation based increasingly frequently on ever more
minor crimes, like petty larceny or simple assault, that may have re-
sulted in no jail time or even been dismissed by state court judges?
Third, what do you think about the problem of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel where a person is not advised or wrongly advised
about the deportation consequences of a plea? And what of a person
who might have been rightly advised to take an A/ford63 plea, maintain-
ing innocence but accepting a sanction for any number of personal
reasons? What would you do, as a judge, when such a person discovers
that, due to a retroactive change in the law, he will be deported 20
years later?
Finally, and, perhaps most importantly, is it not also right to dis-
tinguish retroactive civil from criminal lawmaking at least in part on
the basis of the ability of the political process to protect against gov-
ernment over-reaching?64 Who has less such ability than noncitizens?
Critic: Whew! Well, I see where some doctrinal maneuvering might be
warranted but I still think you've put too much weight on this pun-
ishment aspect. As a matter of fact, I was worried at the very begin-
ning of your Deportation, Social Control Essay65 by the way you slid right
past the most basic justification for these laws—that Congress wanted
to maintain credibility and legitimacy by crafting deportation systems
that were tough and efficient, for a change. This is not an intent to
punish, just to maintain respect for the rule-of-law.
Author: The strength of this point seems to depend on the extent to
which we want to rely on the supposed intent of Congress. I am not a
big believer in this particular fiction except, perhaps, in the context of
a bill of attainder claim. 66
 But, even assuming that we could figure out
63 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (no constitutional error in
accepting a guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence when the defendant intelli-
gently concluded that his interests required entry of a guilty plea and the record before
the judge contained strong evidence of actual guilt).
" See Harold .). Krent, The Puzzling- Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Law-
making, 84 GEO. U. 2143, 2167 (1996).
65 See Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1893.
66 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 628-30, 634 rt.4 (1960) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (discussing history of concept of punishment in bill of attainder analysis).
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what hundreds of representatives, senators and a president intended,
I suppose I also have a Kantian sort of problem here. I just do not un-
derstand how we can avoid consideration of the actual effects of laws
without sacrificing individuals as means to a very amorphouS end. Af-
ter all, one could say the same thing to any death-row inmate: we're
not doing this to punish you, just to vindicate our criminal justice sys-
tem. 67 In any event, I'd bet that most legislators who thought about
these laws thought about them as punishment for crime anyway. 68
Critic: Well, I'm not so sure, but let me raise a couple of more specific
problems I have with your line of reasoning. First of all, I don't see
what it really gains you anyway. If, as you say, the convergence between
the two systems often makes the deportation consequence automatic,
then I don't see what. all the fuss about procedural rights would be
about. There's no live issue anyway, is there?
Author: 1 don't think this is right. First, of course, my approach would
impart substantive rights as well as procedural. Second, as to proce-
dural rights, you have to remember that I am not suggesting necessar-
ily that all of the procedures of a criminal trial should be available in
deportation cases. I do not, for example, think a jury trial necessarily
would be required. It seems to me that a quasi-criminal model could
reasonably impart some rights and not others, as has been done in the
past from Boyd v. United States 69 to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezl° to
Gault 7 3 to United States v. Halper 72
The strongest claim may be the right to appointed counsel and a
recognition by courts that failure to consider deportation conse-
quences is ineffective assistance of counsel. This is both because of my
punishment argument and because of the increasing convergence
between the criminal and deportation systems. It is increasingly rea-
sonable to ask public defenders and other appointed counsel to take
immigration consequences into effect. Training is better; materials
67 As Oliver Wendell Ilohnes,-Jr. once stated:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged
(or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for
you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the
common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if
you like.
Hot.14.1r.s-LAsxt LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
0e See Klunstroom, Deportation, Social Control, supra note 2, at 1894 n.20.
62 116 U.S. 616,633-415 (1886).
70 372 U.S. 144,164-67, 186 (1963).
7t 387 U.S. at 1 .
72 490 U.S. 455,447-49 (1989).
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are available, etc. Public Defender offices, at least in New York and
Massachusetts, have recognized this responsibility. Others are doing
the same. And private attorneys have no excuse, in my view, for ignor-
ing these issues.
Critic: But what could a lawyer do in such a case? If the convergence is
so complete and if the sanction is so automatic, a lawyer seems more
like an ornament than a real protector.
Author: Good question: As a matter of fact, a similar question on this
point was raised in Mendoza-Martinez. 73 It's a real problem for my ar-
gument but not conclusive and here's the basic reason why: automatic
does not necessarily mean inevitable. Inevitable does not necessarily
mean constitutional. And constitutional does not mean eternally so. 74
Put more pragmatically, there is always some play in the joints for
a good lawyer to find. So a right to counsel can make a major differ-
ence, even in an apparently open and shut case. This is especially true
if it means, as I believe' it should, a right to a lawyer who is competent
in both immigration and criminal law and who recognizes the consti-
tutional issues at stake in such cases. We have not yet done enough
studies to see how those who can afford such counsel fare as com-
pared to those who cannot. In my experience, however, the difference
is often profound.
Critic: Any other rights you think are especially important?
Author: Substantively, I'd suggest that the most significant claims are
anti-retroactivity, and a right to bail both pending a final determina-
tion and after an order has entered if it cannot be enforced in a rea-
sonable period of time. And if proportionality is going to be a part of
our constitutional discourse in areas like fines,75 then I'd suggest it
should also play a role in our analysis of deportation laws. I recognize,
of course, that I'm swimming against a powerful stream on this latter
point.
73
 See:372 U.S. at 169-67.
74 As Henry Hart once put it so well:
[TI he judges who sit for the time being on the court have no authority to re-
make by fiat alone the fabric of principle by which future cases are to be de-
cided. They are only the custodians of the law and not the owners of it. The
law belongs to the people of the country, and to the hundreds of thousands
of lawyers and judges who through the years have struggled, in their behalf,
to make it coherent and intelligible and responsive to the people's sense of
justice.
Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dia-
lectic, 66 HARI:. L. Km 1362, 1396 (1953).
75 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334-49.
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Critic: Well, since you brought up proportionality again, I have an-
other problem with your approach. Doesn't your use of the extended
border control/social control dichotomy76 create a strange anomaly?
Why should long-term resident aliens who face deportation for, say
paperwork infractions, end up with fewer or less substantial protec-
tions than criminals?
Author: That is a conceptual problem, but I'm not sure that it's my
problem. It is often the case that civil sanctions can be more onerous
than criminal ones. This is exactly why I do not suggest that we rely on
the formal civil/criminal line so much as the more flexible and func-
tional idea of punishment. And that's why the Supreme Court, for
more than a century, has repeatedly found itself drawn back to this
functional approach in various contexts." I'd analyze "civil" deporta-
tion cases more or less as the Court dealt with the "civil" fines at issue
in Hatper: 78 Indeed, I detect a trend of this type in the way some
courts are approaching retroactivity analysis in recent deportation
cases. The First Circuit, for example, recently held that Section 212(c)
relief will continue to be available for persons whose convictions pre-
dated AEDPA79 if the noncitizen "reasonably relied" on the availability
of such relief at the time of a guilty plea or at the time it was decided
not to contest the charges. 80 My point has simply been that such an
approach is even more justifiable in the criminal deportation context
because of the additional elements of social control, legislative intent
(however amorphous), and systemic convergence.
Critic: You know, one other thing bothers me about this. Your ap-
proach depreciates the importance of the criminal system. Don't you
think it's important to maintain a distinction that vindicates the sham-
ing and other critical functions of the criminal sanction?" If you keep
blurring the line, pretty soon a criminal conviction will lose its mean-
ing. Isn't it important to keep criminal sanctions distinct from non-
punitive consequences of criminal action?
Author: This is a nice point, but I think it's rather abstract and aca-
demic. My first goals are fairness and consistency in the real treatment
76 See Kanstroorn, Deportation, Social Control, supra ante 2, at 1899-1914.
77 See id. at 1914-26.
78 See 490 U.S. at 447-50.
76 Pub. Law No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (eliminated INA § 212(c) relief for
many types of cases); see also INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed in 1996).
8° See Mattis, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9152, at *19.
SI See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997).
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of real people to the maximum extent possible consistent with realis-
tic cost and the maintenance of basic legitimacy. I am prepared to say
that those should be the goals of our legal system in general. The best
way to accomplish those goals is to understand constitutional rights of
all persons functionally, not formalistically, and not too symbolically.
Moreover, the obviously punitive intent of these laws strongly supports
my doctrinal claim that deportation of this type is punishment. As
Holmes once put it, "even a dog distinguishes between being stum-
bled over and being kicked."82 I'd suggest that this also applies to be-
ing kicked out of the country for having done something wrong.
If you want to have a symbolic aspect of the criminal justice sys-
tem focus on the people you really want to condemn, then you can
certainly have that. But it seems wrong to me to deprive people of the
right to counsel or subject them to retroactive sanctions or incarcer-
ate them with no right to bail simply because you are afraid of some
abstract symbolic consequence that might flow from recognizing the
reality of what's being done to them.
82 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CONIMON LAW 3 (Dover Publications, Inc, 1991)
(1881).
